Moral enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally, Reply to C. Bublitz by Focquaert, Farah & Schermer, Maartje
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	http://www.researchgate.net/publication/281901523
Moral	Enhancement:	Do	Means	Matter	Morally,
Reply	to	Christoph	Bublitz
ARTICLE	·	AUGUST	2015
READS
3
2	AUTHORS:
Farah	Focquaert
Ghent	University
28	PUBLICATIONS			109	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Maartje	Schermer
Erasmus	MC
77	PUBLICATIONS			539	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Available	from:	Farah	Focquaert
Retrieved	on:	04	October	2015
Online Neuroethics Symposium on The Brains Blog 
http://philosophyofbrains.com/2015/08/25/neuroethics-symposium-on-focquaert-schermer-moral-enhancement-do-means-matter-morally.aspx 
 
Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?  
Reply to Christoph Bublitz 
Farah Focquaert & Maartje Schermer  
We would like to thank Christoph Bublitz for his interesting and in-depth comment and for the 
attention he draws to the control criterion within the moral enhancement debate. We agree with 
most of what he argues in response to our paper and will, in our future work, consider his 
suggestion to understand active participation as one aspect of the control criterion. 
We completely agree with Bublitz when he argues that “the first effect of an intervention is a 
physical process in the brain. This is true for all interventions, be it talk therapy, pharmacology or 
brain stimulation. And as every mental state has a neuronal correlate; every alteration of the mind 
is inseparable from an alteration of precisely this correlate. Therefore, one cannot target the mind 
without targeting the brain, or change the mental state directly but the underlying neuronal state 
only indirectly.” This is important to highlight, and we completely agree that ‘the moral 
enhancement debate should be in tune with insights of philosophy of mind and not reproduce 
folk psychological ideas, deeply imbued with vague dualistic intuitions’. The last thing our paper 
aims to defend is any kind of dualistic notion of the mind-brain relation and we thank Bublitz for 
giving us the chance to clearly state this.  
Differentiations in terms of whether the mind or the brain is the prime or direct target of an 
intervention are indeed ontologically meaningless. We agree that it will not help to refer to the 
“aims” of the intervention, as the immediate aims are the same for both active and passive 
intervention. Engaging in talk therapy to combat anxiety, or taking pharmaceuticals to combat 
anxiety, aim at the same thing: relieving an individual of his/her anxiety. Moreover, if effective, 
comparable (or the same) post-intervention brain alterations will be observable in terms of brain 
structure and functioning. When we draw a distinction between direct versus indirect and/or 
passive versus active, we are referring to the process by which the changes come about, not merely 
the way in which the brain exerts its effects. Talk therapy, pharmaceuticals or deep brain 
stimulation (e.g. for reducing anxiety) are very different processes by which the same or very 
similar effects (can) come about.  
In our view, the ability to rationally reflect upon changes is a central part of what it means for an 
intervention to be active, i.e. to involve active participation on behalf of the individual 
undergoing the intervention. We do not argue that a person will be unable to reflect upon the 
effects of a substance (e.g. SSRIs) or stimulation (e.g. tDCS). We argue that there’s a greater 
likelihood that such reflection might be compromised, either due to the abruptness of the 
changes or due to the concealed nature of the changes. We fully agree that individuals can reflect 
upon changes, e.g. those caused by pharmaceuticals, and decide whether to continue or withdraw 
medication in light of the effects. Overall, we think that pharmaceuticals leave more room for 
reflection compared to interventions like deep brain stimulation. Although we consider the use of 
pharmaceuticals as more passive compared to CBT, we regard pharmaceuticals as (potentially) 
more active compared to deep brain stimulation.  
Last but certainly not least, we fully agree that control matters morally in case of deliberate moral 
enhancements, where control is understood very broadly and ought to incorporate voluntariness 
and prospective and retrospective endorsement of potential identity changes. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
  
Comment on “Do Means Matter Morally?” 
By Dr. Christoph Bublitz 
University of Hamburg 
 
Farah Focquaert and Martje Schermer address the question whether means to alter minds 
matter morally. To appreciate the significance of the topic, it might be helpful to put it in a 
broader perspective. Among the central controversies of neuroethics is the question whether 
novel means to intervene into brains and minds are qualitatively different to traditional ones, and 
whether this difference – if there is one – has normative ramifications. This is not only of 
academic interest, but stands in the background of ordinary everyday decisions. On the individual 
level, persons may, for instance, ask whether they should take antidepressants, or give Ritalin to 
their kids, or whether the desired effects could – and perhaps should – be brought about on 
different ways, such as more exercise or a different diet. On the collective-political level, one may 
ask whether a societal setup in which a percentage of the population is permanently medicated 
with psychoactive substances so that these persons can cope with and participate in social life 
might be in need of reform (e.g. a different school or employment system). Thus, broadly 
speaking, choosing the ways by which we influence our own and other persons’ minds is a topic 
of common concern and not necessarily related to neurotechnologies.  
The advent of novel technologies, however, has pushed the question into the limelight. 
With respect to their use, two main positions can broadly be distinguished. One camp views 
novel technologies with suspicion because they somehow differ from traditional ones, and this 
difference provides sufficient reasons to evaluate them differently. The challenge is to identify the 
difference and to show that it is of moral significance. Candidates are their non-naturalness 
(artificiality), the fact that they change the brain (rather than the mind), that they are more 
“direct”, or their impact on the authenticity (identity) of consumers. The contrasting position 
seeks to debunk these ostensible differences: In the end, all interventions alter brains and minds. 
Since there are no intrinsic differences between old and novel means both should be treated on 
par.1 To clarify: everyone agrees that different means have different effects (e.g., strength) and 
side-effects. The question is whether apart from such effects, novel direct and older indirect 
means exhibit normatively relevant differences. Confronted with this question, most people 
intuitively suspect that novel technologies are indeed qualitatively different. Proponents of the 
parity principle deserve credit for challenging such intuitions and for having exposed several 
weaknesses in respective arguments, especially from bioconservative quarters. Nonetheless, some 
differences may still remain.  
In this vein, Focquaert & Schermer argue that a morally relevant difference lies in the fact 
that some interventions require – or rely on – activity of affected persons, whereas persons can 
remain passive recipients in others. This difference in activity is normatively relevant as it relates 
to autonomy and identity of the person. Elsewhere, I have tried to argue in the same direction, 
and I concur with Focquaert & Schermer’s conclusions.2 Nonetheless, I’d like to put some critical 
questions to them as to how the distinction between active and passive interventions should be 
understood and whether it tracks the normatively relevant features of interventions. I wish to 
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note that all distinctions between interventions – mine included – are fraught with serious 
problems. Yet, in order to make progress we have to lay them open.  
1. Direct / Indirect 
In the debate, a distinction is usually drawn between direct and indirect interventions. 
Focquaert & Schermer seek to replace this distinction: The “morally relevant difference is not 
that between direct and indirect interventions per se, but between … active and passive 
interventions”.3 Active interventions are those that require psychological or behavioral effort, 
whereas passive interventions bring about the desired end by themselves. Why should activity be 
the relevant criterion? The authors suggest that more passive interventions potentially 
compromise autonomy and identity of affected persons to a stronger degree than more active 
interventions.  
Before I turn to the merits of their approach, let me briefly elaborate upon the direct / 
indirect distinction as presented by the authors. According to them, indirect interventions “aim to 
change thought patterns and behavior and thus rewire ... brain structure and functioning, whereas 
direct interventions aim to change brain structure and function and thereby … thought patterns 
and behavior”. In short: Indirect interventions target the mind, direct interventions target the 
brain. Focquaert & Schermer are aware that this is a crude juxtaposition because any intervention 
inevitably alters both brain and mind.4 Nonetheless, they seemingly consider some interventions 
to be “more direct” than others, e.g. when they compare neurofeedback to talk therapy.5 In their 
discussion of other interventions they write, for instance, that talk therapy “directly” influences 
mental states and indirectly the underlying brain states, whereas DBS supposedly does vice versa.  
The way the difference is presented here is metaphysically dubious and morally dangerous as 
it prejudices normative assessments. I even suspect Focquaert & Schermer agree with me in this 
point, but let me make it clear: The problem concerns the way causality runs in the picture the 
authors present. Apparently some causal chains primarily or directly target the mind and “thus” 
indirectly the brain, while others primarily or directly change the brain and “thereby” indirectly 
the mind. So in some way, direct interventions supposedly alter the brain in a more 
straightforward fashion – “more directly”. This description of the difference seems to express 
unfounded intuitions about the brain-mind relation. I am aware of the difficulties and 
technicalities of formulating more correctly at this point, but neuroethics should incorporate 
insights of philosophy of mind and not reproduce folk psychological ideas, deeply imbued with 
vague dualistic intuitions. On the physical level, all there is are causal processes that emanate 
from a source and end up altering brains of recipients. Somewhere along the process, mental and 
conscious phenomena may come in. The first effect of an intervention is a physical process in the 
brain. This is true for all interventions, be it talk therapy, pharmacology or brain stimulation. And 
as every mental state has a neuronal correlate; every alteration of the mind is inseparable from an 
alteration of precisely this correlate. Therefore, one cannot target the mind without targeting the 
brain, or change the mental state directly but the underlying neuronal state only indirectly.6 Both 
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are in some – concededly mysterious – way ontologically connected, and can thus only be 
targeted in the same manner. Suggesting otherwise presupposes that both can be separated 
(substance dualism). As a consequence, differentiations in terms of whether the mind or the brain 
is the prime or direct target of an intervention become meaningless.  
Moreover, it will not help to refer to the “aims” of an intervention. Aims are subjective (only 
interveners, not interventions, aim at something), and descriptions of aims merely express 
linguistic conventions which again inherit dualistic thinking. We may speak of aiming to change 
another’s “thoughts” or “feelings”, but this can only be understood as aiming to change their 
respective neuronal correlates as well. Likewise, a doctor can prescribe antidepressant to increase 
serotonin levels, but ultimately he aims at alleviating the depressive condition. Trauma therapy 
can target “the memory” or its over-consolidated engram. How aims are phrased does not 
change anything in substance.  
How then can one intervention be “more direct” than another? What is the standard for 
directness? The “length” of the causal chain? The time it takes? Compare two interventions: 
Person A watches psychedelic patterns on a large screen (or virtual-reality glasses). Person B 
ingests a psychoactive substance that induces hallucinogenic visions. Let us suppose effects are 
the same – a prolonged phenomenal experience of psychedelic patterns – and ignore side-effects. 
Which intervention is more direct? I suspect: the perception. Once visual stimuli hit the retina, a 
cascade of brain processes is set into motion. The pill, however, has to undergo many chemical 
reactions, it has to be digested, metabolized, cross the blood-brain-barrier and modify the brain’s 
visual system. In many aspects, the perception appears more direct. Surely, this contravenes how 
the distinction is regularly understood: pharmaceuticals are direct interventions whereas 
perceptual stimuli are indirect one. Speaking of direct, indirect or “more direct” interventions is 
thus misleading and invites dubious associations.  
If one wishes to maintain the distinction it has to be specified. My suggestion is to define 
indirect interventions as sensory stimuli, i.e. those perceived by our outward senses. This is a 
technical definition that neither allows for comparative forms (more or less direct), nor for 
distinctions between targeted mental states and their neuronal correlates. What matters in ethical 
evaluations is, in my account, the route that stimuli take because persons have more control over 
some and less over others.   
The thrust of Focquaert & Schermer’s argument goes in the same direction. They suggest 
“that the distinction between direct and indirect interventions tracks an underlying distinction 
between interventions that require active involvement and effort of the person, and those that 
allow for the subject to remain a ´passive recipient`.” They further hold that it is this criterion 
rather than the direct / indirect distinction which is normatively salient.7 Does the active/passive 
difference make sense – and is it normatively relevant? 
2. Active / Passive  
This poses the question how to understand “active” and “passive” more precisely. Focquaert 
& Schermer present some striking examples: Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) surely requires 
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ongoing mental efforts whereas the effects of DBS set in without further conscious mental 
actions.  Nonetheless, I wonder whether this observation generalizes, i.e. whether activity vs. 
passivity really “tracks” the direct/indirect distinction as the authors suggests, or whether it 
merely sometimes coincides with it. In general, applying notions such as activity and passivity or 
loosely related ones such as integrity or (in)stability to the mind can be problematic. For all we 
know, the mind-brain system is ever-changing, highly dynamic, and works on different levels. 
The conscious mind can be – phenomenally – passive, effortless while subconscious and brain 
mechanisms are nonetheless actively processing information. Thus, effects of a supposedly 
passive intervention such as pharmaceuticals can, I suppose, be quite dynamic and generate lots 
of activity – on lower levels.  
Surely, one can understand – as Focquaert & Schermer seem to do – activity as consciously 
willed effort. But this might be too narrow to capture normatively relevant differences.  Consider, 
for instance, a typical indirect intervention and a classic practice of moral enhancement, moral 
education. Suppose a state organizes nationwide screenings of a movie about the flight of Yezidis 
from Syria, escaping enslavement by the Islamic State and crossing over to Europe on a ‘floating 
coffin’, which changes many viewers’ opinions on immigration and motivates some to assist 
refugees. In which sense is watching a movie “active”– is a TV audience not often conceived as a 
paradigm case of ‘passive recipients’? Watching movies requires subconscious information 
processing, but hardly mental effort. Compare this to a classic indirect intervention, the effects of 
a psychoactive substance such as LSD which may cause a more peaceful relation to oneself and 
others. During such an artificially altered state of consciousness, consumers may monitor 
themselves to identify mental changes, engage with their altered perceptions of the world and 
themselves, play with their altered sensory apparatus and wonder about questions that appear in a 
different light. This requires conscious mental activity, which in turn seems to alter the 
psychological effects of the substance. Drawing distinctions between watching a movie and 
consuming psychoactive substances in terms of conscious mental activity does not seem 
warranted.  
Focquaert & Schermer may reply by pointing to the “room for rational reflection and 
deliberation” that the movie leaves. But this seems equally true for the effects of a pill. In any 
case, “rational reflection upon changes” is a criterion different to activity. I presume many 
interventions leave room for post-hoc rational reflection of changes. The presentation of the 
authors, however, suggests the contrary: CBT, for instance, leaves “ample room for the individual 
to rationally reflect upon changes brought about as the interventions continues and to withdraw 
from the intervention if one cannot identify with these changes, or to reject certain changes and 
endorse others. By contrast, when directly altering an individual’s brain functioning, subsequent 
changes to one’s identity cannot be deliberated on in the same gradual manner and cannot be 
selectively endorsed or rejected”.8  
I am not persuaded such a “contrast” exists. Why should a person be unable to reflect upon 
the effects of a substance or stimulation – at least once it wears off? We do reflect upon changes, 
e.g. those caused by pharmaceuticals, and decide whether to continue or withdraw medication in 
light of effects. Why should this not be possible with psychoactive moral medications?  Moral 
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bioenhancements are not permanent, irreversible interventions, nor do they undermine capacities 
for rational reflection. Post-intervention reflection does not depend on active involvement during 
interventions.  
The quoted passage entails the further argument that one cannot selectively endorse or reject 
alterations. Strictly speaking, one can selectively endorse or reject new properties (“I endorse X 
but reject Y”). One may be unable to selectively alter properties because direct interventions cause 
several effects. Effects may come in a bundle so that the only options are to take or reject all. 
This, however, is an empirical assumption, and pertains to a different argument. Whether an 
intervention has fine-tuned, specific or broad-spectrum effects depends on the precise mode of 
its operation. It does not track the direct or indirect distinction. Specific direct interventions are 
just as conceivable as broad-spectrum indirect ones. Nor does it track the active/passive 
criterion. Consider psychotherapy: its effects take a long time, one cannot retrospectively undo 
them, and it potentially alters many mental properties of a person. DBS, by contrast, can be 
turned off – or the voltage adjusted – in minutes. In other words: interventions may differ with 
respect to their specificity and unwanted side-effects which inevitably accompany desired main 
effects. This is true for interventions of all categories, active/passive, direct/indirect. The 
consequence is not that a class of intervention is preferable to another, but that the effects of 
some interventions are only attainable by taking side-effects upon oneself.  
3. From activity to control 
However, this should not convey the impression that activity and passivity are not of 
normative relevance. Just as the authors suggest that the active/passive difference tracks the 
normative relevant features of the direct/indirect distinction, I would like to suggest that the 
active/passive distinction is shorthand for – and often tracks – another criterion which ultimately 
matters normatively: control. As I have argued elsewhere – and the authors quote this 
approvingly – the abstract normative idea that should guide interventions into mind and brain is 
mental self-determination. A central part of it is conscious mental control.9 Any intervention that 
requires active participation or even effort is almost by definition controllable – conscious activity 
and control often overlap, they can refer to the same mental capacity. However, one can also 
control supposedly “passive” technological devices such as DBS. Insofar as the individual 
controls the parameters of such interventions (e.g., through the simulator), her autonomy is not 
undermined, even though she remains “passive” and effects set in “by themselves”. Problems 
with control only arise if others control such devices – and thereby functions of mind and brain – 
without consent of affected persons. Conversely, passive interventions may even increase control 
when they enable steering of mental functions which we cannot access by conscious effort or 
activity. Activity and control are thus not the same. The general moral relevant criterion is 
control, of which conscious activity is an important, but not the only or even a necessary element.  
In light of control, the direct/indirect distinction which the authors seek to absolve appears 
meaningful. We have more control over indirect interventions, defined as those stimuli that enter 
our brain via our senses, than over those that alter our minds through electricity, magnetic fields 
or chemical changes because we lack conscious control capacities over these properties. Indirect 
interventions can be further subdivided in those that come to conscious awareness and others 
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that do not. We have more control over the former. But even if we lack conscious control over 
the many subconscious mechanisms that process sensory information, I suggest that the entire 
system has more control over the stimuli which it was shaped by evolution to process than over 
direct interventions. Of course, empirical assumptions come in here, and there may be 
exceptions. I hasten to note that we do not possess full control even over conscious indirect 
stimuli, as the emotional reactions to a heartbreaking story of refugees show. Nonetheless, 
control seems to be the normatively appropriate criterion to draw distinctions between different 
means to change minds. 
Finally, I wish to note that despite these – a bit hairsplitting – objections, I concur with much 
in Focquaert & Schermer argument and find their contribution of the activity criterion to the 
debate of great importance.  
 
 
